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Article 5

THE DEMISE OF RES JUDICATA IN Ex PARTE PATENT OFFICE PRACTCE

I. Introduction
The question of the applicability of res judicata in ex parte Patent Office
practice has been plaguing both the courts and the Patent Office for a number
of years. This Note will consider the doctrine of res judicata as a judicial
concept, the nature of ex parte proceedings before the Patent Office, and the
use of res judicata in unappealed final rejections of the Primary Examiner and
in appealed rejections of the Examiner. At the outset it is to be observed that
the applicability of res judicata in other areas of patent law, e.g., interference
proceedings of infringement suits, rests on considerations radically distinct from
those pertinent to the question at hand.' The principles which govern in one
situation may be entirely inappropriate in another.
II.

Res Judicata2

Within the term "res judicata," as it is loosely employed, are comprehended
two distinct concepts, viz., res judicata, and collateral estoppel. In the words
of the United States Supreme Court,
The general rule of res judicata applies to repetitious suits involving
the same cause of action. .

.

. The rule provides that when a court of

competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a
cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound
"not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose." . . . The judgment puts an

end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation
between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent fraud or some
other factor invalidating the judgment....
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a
different cause or demand, the principle of res judicata is applied more
narrowly. In this situation, the judgment in the prior action operates as
an estoppel, not as to matters which might have been litigated and determined, but "only as to those matters m issue or points controverted,
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered." . . .
Once a party has fought out a matter in litigation with the other party,
he cannot later renew the duel. In this sense, res judicata is usually and
more accurately referred to as estoppel by judgment, or collateral
estoppel ....

3

Thus the distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel is that
1 In inter-party proceedings, the rights of private contestants weigh as an additional
consideration. See Stringham, Patent Office Rejections as Res Judicata, 9 J. PAT. OFF.
Soo'Y 399 (1927).
2 See generally 1B J. MooRB, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 0.401-.448 (2d ed. 1965); Vestal,
Res Judicata / Claim Preclusion;Judgment for the Claimant, 62 Nw. U.L. Rav. 357 (1967);
C. A. Wright. The Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A.J. 742, 745
(1966); Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion / Res Judicata, 62 MIC. L. REv. 33
(1963); Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 '(1948).
3 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948); accord, Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
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in the former all issues that might have been determined concerning the cause
of action or claim are ineligible for subsequent judicial determination, while
in the latter only those issues actually decided are considered as having been
finally determined. Now that this distinction has served the purpose of highlighting the precise nature of res judicata, the concept of collateral estoppel
may be dismissed from further consideration for the reason that it plays no
active part in the area of ex parte Patent Office prosecutions.'
Based upon the preceding, the following operational definition of res
judicata may be proposed: Res judicata is the doctrine by which a valid, final,
prior adjudication on the merits of a cause of action or claim bars relitigation
by the parties or their privies of issues which were or might have been determined. The fact that res judicata bars relitigation of matters actually determined in a prior adjudication is not particularly surprising; indeed, its absence
would be cause for wonder. But insofar as res judicata bars a determination
of matters that might have been litigated in prior adjudication, it becomes
apparent that the doctrine has vast potential for being applied in a rigorous
and harsh manner. This potential for harshness can be vividly illustrated by
calling attention to the situation in which it appears that the party who is now
bound as to all the issues that might have been determined would have prevailed if he had only properly presented his claim.5 Further, to the extent that
all the issues were not actually presented, it cannot be said that the party
actually received a determination on the merits. Symptomatic of the judicial
response to the plight of a claimant so situated is the Latin maxim, res judicata
6
facit ex albo nigrum; ex nigro, album; ex curvo, rectum; ex recto curvum.
Such deliberate nonconcern with the actual merits of a subsequent claim
can be justified only by the most demanding contrary considerations. Generically,
the justification of res judicata rests upon recognition of the fact that human
resources, as applied to a specific endeavor, must be limited short of total expenditure. Specifically, the justifications are that litigation should have a
terminal point, that judicial energy should be conserved, and that certainty
in legal relations is both desirable and necessary. Finally, in inter-party proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata embodies an elementary notion of fairness,
viz., an adversary ought be free from harassment by his opponent.7
4 This, however, is not the case in inter-party proceedings. The extent to which the
concept of collateral estoppel should be more expansively employed in inter-party proceedings has been the subject of several spirited commentaries. See Kananen, Comments and
Observations on Res Judicata and Patent Law, 18 W. REs. L. Rav. 103 (1966); C. M.
Wright, United States Patent System and the Judiciary, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soo'y 727 (1965).
5 See e.g., Application of Prutton, 204 F.2d 291 (CCPA 1953). Of course, there are
techniques for ameliorating the strictness of res judicata. Most notable, perhaps, are procedures for opening up final judgments. See FED. P. Civ. P. 60(b); 7 J. Mooaa, FEDERAL
PPAciCo
§§ 60.09-.42 (2d ed. 1955); Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Finality of Civil judgments v. Self-Correction by District Court of Judicial Error of Law, 43 NOTRE DAME LAWnER
98 (1967). A less obvious technique would be to restrict the definition of cause of action
or claim. Before res judicata applies, it must first be determined that the subsequent litigation presents the same cause of action or claim for decision as did the former proceeding.
The narrower the definition of a cause of action or claim, the fewer will be the instances
in which res judicata can be applied.
6 "A thing adjudged makes white, black; black, white; the crooked, straight; the
straight, crooked."
7 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
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Admittedly, one might reason from the finite character of human existence
to the need for an abstract concept of res judicata. It is important to observe,
however, that the specific, mature concept of res judicata, which is used today
in judicial proceedings, is not the result of any a priori reasoning. Rather, it
is a pragmatic response, its contours being the embodiment of a compromise,
such as attends the resolution of all conflicting legitimate demands. Therefore,
there is nothing sacred about the doctrine of res judicata in its judicial form.
This means, primarily, that the question of res judicata in ex parte patent
practice is not whether the doctrine should be adopted in its mature form as
developed by the common law technique, nor whether it should be rejected in
toto.8 The question is how may the concept best be utilized in regulating the
disposition of patent applications so as to give adequate recognition to the need
for consideration on the merits without causing an excessive dissipation of
human resources.
III. The Procedural Apparatus of the Patent Office9
The procedural machinery of the Patent Office is set in motion by the
filing of a written application with the Commissioner of Patents. The application consists of a specification, a drawing, and an oath.10 The specification is
a disclosure of the invention that describes the best method of practicing the
invention, explains both its utility and advantages over prior inventions, and
concludes with claims that point out the subject matter that the applicant
regards as his invention." A drawing is required only if the nature of the case
permits one." By means of the oath, an applicant affirms that he is the sole
and original inventor of the subject matter submitted.1 ' In response to such
application, the Commissioner of Patents is required to cause an examination
to be made of the alleged new invention. 4
In order to secure allowance of the broadest claims possible, it is customary
for an applicant to present several claims, some covering the invention broadly
and some covering specific embodiments thereof. Since the specification is the
applicant's offer in exchange for the grant of a limited monopoly, the Examiner,
as representative of the public interest, attempts to limit the claims as narrowly
8

Cf. 2 K.

9

See generally

DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 18.03, at 558-59 (1958).

MANUAL OF PATENT EXAmINING PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as MPEP]; A. McCRA.Y, PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE (4th ed. 1959); Note, The Doctrine

of Res Judicata in Ex Parte Patent PracticeL. REV. 716 (1956).

10
11

1966).
12
power
13
14

Prototype for a Liberal Approach, 10

RUTGERs

35 U.S.C. § 111 (1964).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention. . . . 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964), as amended, 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp.
35 U.S.C.
to require
35 U.S.C.
35 U.S.C.

§ 113 (1964). See also 35 U.S.C. § 114 (1964)
an applicant to furnish a model of his invention).
§ 115 (1964).
§ 131 (1964).

(giving the Commission
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as possible, and thus, the scope of the monopoly. There results from these conflicting interests a process that more nearly resembles bargaining and negotiation
than litigation. This process is accompanied by exchanges of correspondence
between the applicant and the Examiner, during which time the power to
amend applications is limited only by the requirement that no new matter be
introduced."5
If a compromise cannot be reached and the applicant's claims have been
twice rejected, such rejection is considered final and appeal may be had to the
Patent Office Board of Appeals,", with further appeal lying to the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court
by writ of certiorari. As an alternate avenue of relief, an applicant may bring
a civil action against the Commissioner of Patents in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, then to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia by appeal, and by certiorari to the Supreme Court."7
If an applicant wishes to forego an appeal, he may file a second application with the Patent Office. This may be either a continuation, 8 by which an
applicant may introduce a new set of claims and establish a right to further
examination, or a continuation-in-part. 9 This latter procedure offers a technique whereby a subsequent application can be related to a rejected parent
application and receive the benefit of the filing date of the parent application
insofar as the disclosure in the parent application is common to the disclosure
in the subsequent one. °
IV. Res Judicata and Unappealed Final Rejections
of the Primary Examiner
In Overland Motor Company v. Packard Motor Company" the United
States Supreme Court recognized the appropriateness of giving res judicata
effect to the unappealed final rejections of the Primary Examiner. Application
of the doctrine was optional, however, depending on the discretion of the Patent
Office 2 The policy adopted by the Patent Office was clearly to forego the
15 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1964).
16 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1964). Under the present Patent Office practice of "compact prosecution," a final rejection is rendered on the second action on the merits. See Address of
Commissioner Edward 1. Brenner, 811 O.G. Pat. Off.. 299 (1965); Address of Commissioner
Edward J. Brenner, 803 O.G. Pat. Off. 893 (1964).
Of course the above narration assumes that the final rejection was based, broadly, upon
an insufficient disclosure. For numerous other possible grounds of rejection, see MPEP §§
706-706.03(z).
17 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1964).
18 MPEP § 201.07 (as rev. July 13, 1967).
19 Id. §§ 201.08, 201.11.
20
An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided

by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an application previously
filed . . . by the same inventor shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as

though filed on the date of the prior application ....
35 U.S.C. § 120 (1964).
For an example of a situation where it is crucial for an applicant to obtain the benefit of an
earlier filing date, see Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80 (CCPA 1965).
21 274 U.S. 417 (1927).
22 In so disposing of the case, the Supreme Court was merely following the lead of
In re Barratt's Appeal, 14 App. D.C. 255 (D.C. Cir. 1899). For a discussion of the preOverland cases, see Stringham, Patent Office Rejections as Res Judicata, 9 J. PAT. OFF.
Soa'Y 399 (1927); Ballard, Res Adjudicata as a Ground of Rejection, 5 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 238 (1923).
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invocation of res judicata in the unappealed final rejections of the Examiner"
except for the "special situation" in which a continuation-in-part application
was filed, and then, only if the parent application had been rejected because
of insufficient disclosure. 4 Thus, in accord with the discretion sanctioned by
the Court in Overland, there developed two lines of cases regarding the application of res judicata to continuation-in-part applications. If the parent application had been rejected on the basis of prior art, res judicata did not apply;25
but an attempt to rely upon a parent application, previously rejected on account
of disclosure insufficient to support allowable claims, "involved" res judicata."
Unfortunately, the term "involved" went undefined.
In Lavin v. Pierott 7 and Whittier v. Borchardt8 "the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals held that the ex parte rejections of prior parent applications
on insufficient disclosure were final determinations and binding on the parties
in their inter-party proceedings." 9 Relying upon Lavin and Whittier, the
Patent Office Board of Appeals in Ex parte Buc ° held that the adequacy of
disclosure in a continuation-in-part application could not be considered because
the parent application was rejected for failure to disclose utility. In Ex parte
Pfleger3 ' the Board of Appeals appeared to stray from the principle announced
in Buc by indicating that it thought Lavin and Whittier distinguishable in the
ex parte context. In refusing to apply the doctrine of res judicata, however,
the Board was not being inconsistent with its previous decisions, since the
Examiner's final rejection of the parent application was based on prior art. In
Ex parte Armstrong & Knight32 it was decided that the holding in Buc applied
whatever may have been the reason for rejecting the parent application on
ground of insufficient disclosure.
Shortly after Armstrong & Knight, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals [CCPA] again entered the scene and began a sustained assault upon

23

A prior adjudication against the inventor on the same or similar claims constitutes a proper ground of rejection as res judicata....
The rejection should only be used when the earlier decision was a final,
appellate one, such as a Board of Appeals decision where the time limit for further
remedies has expired, or a decision by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
But see 201.11, last paragraph, for a special situation.
MPEP § 706.03(w) *(as rev. April 12, 1967).
24
Where the first application is found to be fatally defective because of insufficient disclosure to support allowable claims, a second application filed as a "continuation-in-part" of the first application to supply the deficiency is not entitled
to the benefit of the filing date of the first application. Hunt Co. v. Mallinckrodt
Chemical Works, 83 U.S.P.Q. 277 at 281 and cases cited therein. Ex parte Buc
et al., 1957 C.D. 40; 722 O.G. 433. These cases also involve the question of
res judicata.
MPEP § 201.11 (as rev. April 12, 1967).
25 Ex parte Pfleger, 131 U.S.P.Q. 439 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1961); Ex parte Turinsky &
Reck, 100 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1953); Ex parte Smith, 88 U.S.P.Q. 121 (Pat.
Off. Bd. App. 1950) (by implication).
26 MPEP § 201.11 (as rev. April 12, 1967). For the wording of this section, see note
24 supra.
27 129 F.2d 883 (CCPA 1942).
28 154 F.2d 522 (CCPA 1946).
29 Comment, 33 GEO. WASu. L. REV. 1149, 1150-51 (1965).
30 114 U.S.P.Q. 552 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1957).
31 131 U.S.P.Q. 439 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1961).
32 139 U.S.P.Q. 211 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1962).
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the "special situation" doctrine. In Application of Fried"s the CGPA expressly
overruled Lavin and Whittier to the extent that those cases barred reconsideration of different claims on the ground of res judicata. The CGPA said:
Since different claims are here presented the issues decided in the parent
application and those to be here decided are not the same....
While claims as broad as [those] . . . of the parent application might fail
for lack of an adequate disclosure, the parent application might contain
disclosures adequate to support the narrower claims of the later filed application. Thus, res judicata cannot properly be applied in this situation
to
34
preclude a decision on the merits of the new issue here presented.
While Application of Szwarcss sustained the assault by holding that the
invention of the appealed claims must be compared with the invention of the
parent application in order to determine the effect of a prior "adjudication,"
6 In Hitchings the
the climax was reached in Application of Hitchings."
possibility of injustice feared in Fried was not present since both the parent and
appealed dains were identical. Nevertheless, the CUPA extinguished all vitality
remaining in Lavin and Whittier by declaring that the doctrine of res judicata
was not to be applied to the unappealed final rejections of the Examiner.3
The "special situation" doctrine was dissolved in the vapor of judicial disapproval.
Hitchings is interesting, not only for its precise holding, but also because
of the reasons offered in support of the decision. As to the first reason, the
CCPA did not perceive that two different lines of cases had evolved in determining whether res judicata should apply to an Examiner's unappealed final rejection. " On this view, the cases do present a maze of inconsistency and confusion. Faced with this view of the cases and assured that Overland was not
authority for inconsistent and arbitrary action by the Patent Office, the CCPA
denounced the "special situation" doctrine on the ground that there was no
"special situation," but only a hit-or-miss policy followed by the Patent Office."
On the basis of the foregoing, it may be argued that the CCPA offered the
wrong reason for the right decision. The real question, though, would appear
to be, not whether the Patent Office had been consistent, but whether there
was a rational justification for carving out the "special situation" exception
in the first place. On this point, a satisfying reason has yet to be offered, 40 and
33 312 F.2d 930 (COPA 1963).
34 Id. at 931-33. In Kollsman v. Ladd, 226 F. Supp. 186 (D.D.C. 1964), the district
court applied the "different claims" test of Fried to hold that res judicata was improper
when claims in the continuing application were broader than those in the parent application.
The case is criticized in Comment, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv., supra note 29. The student author
observes: "In this situation an Examiner's decision that the narrow claims lack sufficient
disclosure would usually encompass claims more broadly drawn" and thus, a rejection because
of prior adjudication would not be unjust. Id. at 1152 n.27.

35

319 F.2d 277 (CGPA 1963).

36 342 F.2d 80 (COPA 1965).
37 Id. at 85.
38 The Commission sought a rehearing in Hitchings, requesting the court to modify
its decision and hold that the Patent Office had consistentl , followed the policy outlined

in MPEP §§ 706.03(w) and 201.11. Kananen, supra note 4, at 111.

39 Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80, 85 (CGPA 1965).
40 It has been suggested that the "special situation" exception resulted from the use of
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absent such an explanation, it is difficult to see why irrational consistency is
entitled to judicial approval.
The second reason given by the Hitchings court for its decision focused
on the broader questions underlying the concept of res judicata. It was explained that none of the legitimate goals of res judicata in its ex parte context,
i.e., finality of judgments and conservation of judicial energy, could be furthered by giving binding effect to an Examiner's unappealed final rejection.
The CCPA concluded that no party has a substantial interest in being able
to rely on a conclusive judgment as to a particular issue, that res judicata is at
variance with the concept of continuing applications, and that judicial energy
would be conserved.41 Without the application of res judicata, there would be
no need for forced appeals with the result that more time would be spent at
the administrative, not the judicial, level.
V. Res Judicata and Appealed Final Rejections of the Examiner
This area of patent law abounds with confusion that stems from the
inability of appellate tribunals to agree on a standard by which the scope of
res judicata may be determined. Precisely, there has been an inability to agree
on whether res judicata should apply only to those matters actually determined,
or should bar an attempt to raise matters that might have been presented in a
previous application. Prior to its 1967 revision the appropriate provision of
the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure [MPEP] read:
A prior adjudication against the inventor on the same or similar claims
constitutes a proper ground of rejection as res judicata. When a different
question of patentability is 42presented the rejection of res judicata does not
apply. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, where the claims are different, res judicata does not apply.43 The
test for determining whether the claims are different was said to be whether
the claims in the present application are patentable over the claims in the previous application. 4 This is the so-called "subject matter" test; 45 and like its
judicial counterpart, the cause of action or claim, it looks to the underlying
operative facts. MPEP § 706.03 (w) went further, however, and as seen above,
inaccurate terminology. MPEP § 706.03(w) states the general rule concerning res judicata
in ex parte Patent Office practice and then goes on to say that MPEP § 201.11 contains a
"special situation," inferring that the "special situation" refers to res judicata. Section
201.11, though, deals exclusively with the concept of continuity between filing dates, not
res judicata. Section 201.11 merely embodies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1954),
and the "special situation" doctrine had its genesis in the failure to consider the separate
and non-overlapping roles of MPEP § 706.03(w) and § 201.11. Kananen, supra note 4,
at 112-13.
41 Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80, 85 (1965).
42 MPEP § 706.03(w), quoted in Application of Herr, 377 F.2d 610, 611 n.5 (CCPA
1967).
43 Ex parte Stybr, 57 U.S.P.Q. 199 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1942).
44 Application of Prutton, 204 F.2d 291 (CCPA 1953); Hemphill Co. v. Coe, 121 F.2d
897 (D.C. Cir. 1941); In re Ellis, 86 F.2d 412 (COPA 1936); In re Becker, 74 F.2d 306
(COPA 1935). Accord, Application of Lundberg, 280 F.2d 865 (CCPA 1960). "If the
difference [in claims] is one which would not be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art,
the prior adjudication is certainly not a ground for rejection." Id. at 867.
45 See Ex parte Rey, 44 U.S.P.Q. 697 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1940).
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stated that res judicata was not to be invoked where "a different question of
patentability" was presented. While the precise content of this phrase, "different question of patentability," was not given, at the very least it meant that
res judicata was to be no bar as long as the same issue had not been previously
determined."8 Thus, if the present application could' overcome the grounds
upon which the parent application had been rejected, res judicata would not
apply.4 7 Accordingly, one writer has concluded that when res judicata has been
used in the ex parte context, it has rested on a finding that the claims, on the
face of the record, could not escape rejection on the same grounds as before.4
As the following analysis will attempt to show, however, the matter is not
quite so simple. This analysis will consider, first, the history of res judicata~in
the courts and, second, the history of res judicata in the Patent Office.
A. The Courts
The first significant case in this area appears to have been In re Barratt's

Appeal."' The same court had previously upheld the denial of letters patent to
an appellant 0 who, undaunted, filed a new application alleging the same in-

vention as previously rejected. In upholding the rejection of this second application on the basis of res judicata, the court said:
The new application does not make a different case. The case is the same
precise case. The subject matter of the invention is the same. The claim
is the same. Only the specifications and drawings are more full .... [A]ll
of this . ..at the utmost amounts to no more than a clearer and better
declaration or additional proof of the alleged invention. It does not make
any new case .... 51

Although Barratt was inconclusive as to the precise effect of res judicata, 2
it offered a four-pronged rhetorical question as a reason for upholding the res
judicata rejection of appellant's application.
When . . . an application for a patent is after due examination rejected,

and finally determined against the applicant after exhaustion of the manifold right of appeal allowed to him . . . , why should a second applica-

tion be allowed or entertained? Is there any reason why the determination
of the matter should not be regarded as conclusive? If a second application could be regarded as proper, why not ten or twenty successive applications? Where are the applications to stop, and what would become of
46 See Note, 10 RUTGERS L. Rmv., supra note 9, at 719, 721.
47 See Ex parte Spencer, 40 U.S.P.Q. 133 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1938); Ex parte
Gustavson, 14 U.S.P.Q. 332 '(Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1932).
48 "On the basis of the decided cases, the only justified generalization seems to be that
the doctrine of res judicata binds the applicant only as to such matters as have been
actually (whether explicitly or implicitly) adjudicated." Note, 10 RUTGERS L. Rev., supra
note 9, at 721.
49 14 App. D.C. 255 (D.C. Cir. 1899).
50 In re Barratt, 11 App. D.C. 177 (D.C. Cir. 1897).
51 In re Barratt's Appeal, 14 App. D.C. 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1899).
52
In what we have said we do not desire it to be understood that the Patent
Office may not, if it thinks it proper so to do, entertain and adjudicate a second
application for a patent after the first application has been rejected. What we
decide is, that it is not incumbent upon the office as a duty to entertain such
applications, and that, if it refuses to entertain them, it has a perfect legal right
so to do. Id. at 261.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

(December, 1967]

the public business, if it were in the power of one person to obstruct the
operations of the Patent Office by repeated and persistent applications?
These questions answer themselves.5"
The typical language utilized by the courts in upholding res judicata
rejections of patent applications is further illustrated by In re Ellis:5 4
Of course, if... any ...of the appealed claims, contain subject matter
different from the subject matter of the abandoned application, appellant
is entitled to have same considered on its merits, but in order to secure
patent therefor it must appear that the difference involves invention. 55
It may be argued that in none of these cases does the language used by
the courts indicate the underlying reality because in each case there was no
apparent reason for not rejecting the appealed rejection on the same ground
as the prior application. That is, the courts were really deciding the question on
the merits and the res judicata rhetoric merely obscured the actual reason for
the decision. It is unnecessary to become involved in a factual analysis of the
cases to determine the validity of this argument, for any vitality that it might
have had was emasculated by Application of Prutton.56 In Prutton the first
application was rejected on grounds of anticipation, the rejection being affirmed
by the GCPA. The appellant refiled his application and, on the basis of an
affidavit not in evidence in the first application, persuaded the Patent Office
Board of Appeals to hold that his invention was patentable over the prior art.
The Board of Appeals, however, affirmed the Examiner's rejection on the ground
of res judicata. Despite the fact that the subsequent application had escaped
the ground upon which the first application had been rejected, the CCPA,
nevertheless, affirmed the Board of Appeals in these words: "Only if the instant
claims on appeal contain subject matter patentably different from the subject
matter of those [prior] claims is appellant entitled to have them considered on
their merits."5
The appellant contended that he had met this test, arguing that since the
claims in the earlier application had been rejected as unpatentable and since
the present claims were held patentable, on the merits, there must have been
a patentable distinction. The short answer, given by the GOPA, was that the
first determination was erroneous and that this was immaterial in regard to
the question of res judicata.
In Application of Lundberg," the last pronouncement on the question by
the CCPA until 1967,"' the CCPA further elaborated upon the "patentably
distinct" test. The COPA took great pains to point out that the comparison
was not between the present claim and the prior art, but beween the present
claims and the prior adjudicated claims.
53 Id. at 258. For a critical analysis of this rhetorical question, see Application of Herr,
377 F.2d 610, 616 (COPA 1967) (Rich J., concurring).
54 86 F.2d 412 (CCPA 1936).
55 Id. at 415. For language of similar import, see Hemphill Co. v. Coe, 121 F.2d
897 (D.C. Cir. 1941) and In re Becker, 74 F.2d 306 '(CCPA 1935).
56 204 F.2d 291 (CCPA 1953).
57 Id. at 294.
58 280 F.2d 865 (CCPA 1960).
59 The case referred to is Application of Herr, 377 F.2d 610 (CCPA 1967).
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[W]hat must be borne in mind with respect to res judicata is the distinction between claims to different inventions on the one hand and different
claims to the same invention on the other. Where different inventions are
claimed, res judicata does not preclude a new consideration; but where an
applicant is merely presenting new claims to the same invention, the
patentability of which he has already argued before the court, reconsideration of 6the issue of patentability is proscribed by the doctrine of res
judicata. 0

As a consequence of the preceding decisions, one treatise writer was led
to the view that res judicata, in appealed final rejections of the Examiner,
barred consideration, not only of matter actually determined, but of all matters
6
that might have been presented in support of a claim. 1
B. The Patent Office Board of Appeals
The res judicata cases, dealing with appealed final rejections, decided by
the Patent Office Board of Appeals present a rich field of diversity and confusion. Initially, the Board's position appeared to be quite liberal. For example,
in Ex parte Gustavson,62 the Board reversed a res judicata rejection of a second
application, where the first claimed invention was rejected as unpatentable
on the grounds of insufficient disclosure and failure of the affidavits to show
advantage over the prior art. The rationale of Gustavson was that res judicata
was inappropriate because the first rejection was not made on the merits."
This liberal view was further evidenced by Ex parte Nardone,4 in which rej
judicata did not bar a second application even though the specification was
identical with that in the prior case. The reason given was that the previously
,adjudicated claims, unlike those in the second case, were not supported by the
specification.6
60 Application of Lundberg, 280 F.2d 865, 868 (COPA 1960). The author of Lundberg
has subsequently explained that the broad language used there must be read in light of the
factual context to which it was addressed and limited by that factual context. That is, in
Lundberg, the appellant argued, only on the basis of the claims, that a different issue was
being presented to the court in the second application. The CCPA found against the
appellant, as a matter of factual inquiry, and since the appellant's argument was based
only on the point that the claims were different, "so, in consequence, was our opinion."
Application of Herr, 377 F.2d 610, 613 (CCPA 1967) (Rich J., concurring).
61
In ex parte prosecution of patent applications, a distinction must be borne in
mind with respect to res judicata as between claims to different inventions on the
one hand and different claims to the same invention on the other. When different
inventions are claimed, res judicata does not preclude a new consideration; but
where an applicant is merely presenting new claims to the same invention, the
patentability of which he has already argued, reconsideration of the issue of
patentability is proscribed by the doctrine of res judicata. L. ADMUR, PATENT OFFICE
RULES AND PRACTIc ES § 199.2, at 710 (Seidman & Horowitz ed. 1967).
62 14 U.S.P.Q. 332 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1932).
63 This same result was reached in Ex parte Spencer, 40 U.S.P.Q. 133 (Pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1938), where a second application contained a disclosure sufficient to allow the applicant to swear back, thus causing withdrawal of the references, which he was unable to
do on the first application. See also Ex parte Jameson, 23 U.S.P.Q. 179 (Pat. Off. Bd. App.
1934):
We feel therefore that the question of res adjudicata [sic] as here raised is unwarranted inasmuch as the present application overcomes the lack of disclosure in
the prior application and that our decision was rendered principally because of
the lack of disclosure in the former application. Id. at 180-81.
64 41 U.S.P.Q. 588 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1938).
65 But cf. Ex parte Mikeska, 79 U.S.P.Q. 152 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1947) distinguishing
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In Ex parte Atwood16 the Board ignored the distinction drawn in Lundby holding that, since the claims defined a process which was patentable
over the reference, the process was patentable over the prior claims. And in
Ex parte Schott" the Board declared:
berg6 '

[The] decisions are uniform in principle. They all hold that a prior
adjudication should not be considered as binding or be followed when
passing upon the same claim where a different question of patentability
is presented for adjudication because of new evidence or new disclosures.6 "

Evidently the decisions were not so uniform, or at least they were not as
acceptable, because ten members of the Board decided to repudiate the abovequoted statement from Schott in Ex parte Budde. ° Thus, after Budde, it was
the position of the Patent Office "that an 'insufficient disclosure' rejection,
affirmed on appeal, [was] . . . res judicata to all possible claims."'" This is how
7"
matters stood until the COPA rendered its decision in Application of Herr.
C. The Demise of Res Judicata
7
Factually, Herr was almost indistinguishable from Prutton.
Due to a
defective specification in the prior application, a certain affidavit was inadmissible, and the alleged chemical invention was rejected as obvious in view of
the prior art. 4 The Examiner's first final rejection was upheld by the CGPA7
In his second application, the appellant cured the defective specification, thus
laying the foundation for the admission of the affidavit. This time, the Examiner
held that the new evidence of nonobviousness overcame the original rejection,
but nonetheless went on to bar the claim on res judicata grounds. In this disposition the Examiner was upheld by the Board of Appeals." The CCPA, in a
terse opinion, proceeded on the assumption that the appealed claims were
identical to those previously rejected and conceded that the same issue of non-

Nardone on the ground that in Mikeska the claims in the second application would have
been supported by the disclosure in the prior application. The Board, however, went on to intimate that the new claims were substantially the same as the old ones. McCrady's comment on
this pair of cases is: "Where an application presents a different disclosure it may [citing
Nardone] or may not [citing Mikeska] receive consideration." A. McCRADY, PATENT OFFICE
PRACTICE § 138, at 191 '(4th ed. 1959).
66 103 U.S.P.Q. 247 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954).
67 See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
68 136 U.S.P.Q. 383 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1962).
69 Id. at 385. But see Ex parte Ittner, 85 U.S.P.Q. 24 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1948).
"In our opinion, the weight of authority is to the effect that the new claims, to be allowable,
must differ patentably from the claims which have been previously refused." Id. at 27. The
weakness of Ittner is pointed out in Note, The Doctrine of Res .udicata in Ex Parte Patent
Practice Prototype for a Liberal Approach, 10 RuTGERs L. REv. 716 (1956). Ittner
"is somewhat weakened in that it appears not to distinguish clearly between an evidentiary
fact and an ultimate fact .... " Id. at 721 n.11. See also Ex parte Smith, 88 U.S.P.Q. 121
(Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1950).
70 150 U.S.P.Q. 469 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1966).
71 Kananen, Comments and Observations on Res .udicata and Patent Law, 18 W.
REs. L. REv. 103, 115 n.95 (1966).
72 377 F.2d 610 '(CCPA 1967).
73 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
74 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
75 Application of Herr, 304 F.2d 906 (CCPA 1962).
76 Application of Herr, 377 F.2d 610, 611 (CGPA 1967).
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obviousness was again present. Unexpectedly, however, it reversed the Board's
decision:
More to the point . .. the precise issue in the prior Herr appeal was
whether appellant was entitled to allowance of his claims in the application
and record then on appeal. The precise issue here is whether appellant
has legally established7 7 his right to those claims in the application and
record now before us.
Res judicata, then, was held to bar consideration of only those matters of
record in the prior proceeding. Put another way, consideration of issues which
might have been determined is no longer precluded by res judicata.
The reasons offered by the CGOPA for its decision were basically two. First,
the court was unable to conclude that procedural bedlam would reign supreme
in the Patent Office because an applicant would no longer be precluded from
submitting the same application more than once. It was simply unable to conjure
up a situation where a litigant would engage in such a bizarre endeavor, involving
risk, time, and great expense, in exchange for the dubious delight of creating havoc
in the halls of government. Second, and more important, the court felt that any
other disposition of the case would have amounted to an unjust enrichment
of the public at the expense of the inventor. It is this feeling of injustice to the
inventor which strikes at the heart of the matter.
It must be observed that the rationale offered in Hitchings for abolishing
res judicata as applied to final unappealed rejections of the Primary Examiner
(ie., time spent on the administrative level results in a conservation of judicial
energy) is not applicable in appealed final rejections of the Examiner. Rather,
a decision like Herr invites the imposition of further burdens upon judicial
resources. It is clear, therefore, that Herr was the result of a value judgment
by the COPA that this extra burden does not constitute an unnecessary expenditure of judicial energy in view of the ultimate goal to be attained, viz., the
granting of letters patent to all those who, on the merits, are deserving of such
grants.
VI. Conclusion
The present status of res judicata in ex parte Patent Office proceedings
cannot be said to commend itself to the Patent Office. The recent Budde case 8
and the amendment to the MPEP7T indicate that the direction favored by the
Patent Office is opposed to that favored by the COPA. The reason for the
Patent Office's position is not difficult to fathom. At the present moment, the
Patent Office is faced with an inauspicious backlog of patent applications, 0
and observers of the patent system are aware of the fact that the present system
of administration will be in need of revision."' The Patent Office's view on
77 Id.
78 See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
79 See note 23 supra.
80 See The United States Patent System, 1790-1965 - A Look to the Future, 47 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 211 (1965); Address of Commissioner Edward J. Brenner, 811 O.G.
Pat. Off. 299 (1965); Address of Commissioner Edward 1. Brenner, 803 O.G. Pat. Off.
893 (1964)
81 The United States Patent System, 1 790-1965 - A Look to the Future, ssupra note 80.
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res judicata seems but part of a larger effort s2 to expedite business under present
conditions. The wisdom of such a course of action, however, is questionable.
First, it does not appear that a liberal view of res judicata would greatly
decrease Patent Office efficiency."3 Second, the difficulties with which an applicant is confronted in adequately presenting his invention have received official
recognition. 4 Therefore, to assert that a rejection based on a defective specification, whether appealed or not, bars all further claims to the invention impresses
one as being an instance of incomplete justice. This impression can be confirmed by noting that in the reverse situation, where after adjudication by a
court resulting in a decision that the alleged invention is patentable, res judicata
does not apply because the Patent Office may still refuse to grant a patent on
the basis of an additional reference to the prior art not previously cited. 5 To
be sure, this result is put upon the ground that the courts do not order or direct
the Commissioner of Patents to issue letters patent to an applicant; they merely
remand for proceedings consistent with their opinion." But this reasoning only
postpones the crucial question- why have the courts such limited power? The
answer is obviously because it is thought to be in the public interest to refrain
from granting limited monopolies when, in fact, the statutory standards regulating the issuance of patents have not been met. The converse of this proposition should likewise be true.
Attention has been called to the role of our patent system in maintaining
our way of life. By appealing to the legitimate interest of self-concern in granting limited monopolies, the patent system can, to a certain extent, credit itself
with motivating homo faber to extract from nature goods which power our
economy and add convenience to our lives.8 Further, to the extent that we
are a people imbued with a fascination for gadgetry, contrivances of all sorts,
and innovation generally, delighting in the reduction of matter to the will of
men, our patent system plays an integral part in defining and sustaining our
culture. The limited use of res judicata can only act to increase the number
of patents granted and thus further the realization of the interests and values
for which the patent laws were enacted.
John A. Burgess
82 The concept of "compact prosecution," mentioned in note 16 supra, may be cited
as another element of this larger effort.
83 "I am convinced that the savings in time in the Patent Office would be very small
indeed, and that the injustices possible under it [res judicata as a bar to issues which might
have been previously determined] are too large a price to pay." Application of Herr, 377 F.2d
610, 627 (CCPA 1967) (Smith J., concurring). "Adoption of this practice [binding an
applicant only to matters actually determined] has not flooded the Patent Office nor the
courts with 'vexatious litigation,' nor has it encouraged disrespect for judicial determinations."
Note, 10 RUTGERS L. RaV., supra note 69, at 722.
84
The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention be at all
complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with
accuracy, and in view of the fact that valuable inventions are often placed in the
hands of inexperienced persons to prepare such specifications and claims, it is no
matter of surprise that the latter frequently fail to describe with requisite certainty the exact invention . . . .Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
85 Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Kingsland, 179 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
86 Application of Johnsen, 359 F.2d 905 (CCPA 1966); Application of Citron, 326
F.2d 418 (CCPA 1964).
87 The United States Patent System, 1790-1965 - A Look to the Future, supra note 80;
C. M. Wright, United States Patent System and the judiciary, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soa'y 727
(1965).

